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PRESERVING THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA’S  
JAILS AND PRISONS:  THE CASE FOR AMENDING THE  
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT* 
Margo Schlanger** 
Giovanna Shay*** 
Prisons and jails pose a significant challenge to the rule of law 
within American boundaries.  As a nation, we are committed to con-
stitutional regulation of governmental treatment of even those who 
have broken society’s rules.  And accordingly, most of our prisons 
and jails are run by committed professionals who care about prisoner 
welfare and constitutional compliance.  At the same time, for pris-
ons—closed institutions holding an ever-growing disempowered 
population1—most of the methods by which we, as a polity, foster 
government accountability and equality among citizens are unavail-
able or at least not currently practiced.  In the absence of other levers 
 
 *  Copyright © 2008 Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay.  Permission is hereby granted to 
distribute this Article for free or at cost to students enrolled in a class, or to prisoners.  It 
is also available at http://schlanger.wustl.edu (follow link for “publications”).  
   This Article adapts Professor Schlanger’s testimony before the House Judiciary Sub-
committee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security in November of 2007 and an 
American Constitution Society Issue Brief that Professors Schlanger and Shay co-
authored in March of 2007.  See  Review of the Prison Litigation Reform Act:  A Decade of Re-
form or an Increase in Prison and Abuses?:  Hearing on H.R. 1889 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement 
of Margo Schlanger, Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, on behalf of 
the American Bar Association), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
hear_110807.html; MARGO SCHLANGER & GIOVANNA SHAY, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR 
LAW AND POLICY, PRESERVING THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA’S PRISONS:  THE CASE FOR 
AMENDING THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (2007), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/4587.  The authors thank John Boston for his comments, 
and dedicate this Article to the memory of Rachel King, whose work on behalf of prison-
ers was untimely ended in 2008. 
**  Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis; Visiting Professor of Law, University 
of Michigan Law School (Fall 2008); Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA (Spring 2009). 
***  Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
 1 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Key Facts at a Glance:  Correctional 
Populations, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/corr2tab.htm (last visited Nov. 
5, 2008) (reporting 1.6 million inmates in American jails and prisons in 1995; by 2006, 
that number had increased by 42%, to 2.3 million).  For a recent assessment, see PEW 
CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008), available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100(3).pdf. 
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by which these ordinary norms can be encouraged, lawsuits, which 
bring judicial scrutiny behind bars, and which promote or even com-
pel constitutional compliance, accordingly take on an outsize impor-
tance.  Unfortunately, over the past twelve years, it has become ap-
parent that a number of provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (“PLRA”)2 cast shadows of constitutional immunity, contravening 
our core commitment to constitutional governance.  The PLRA’s ob-
stacles to meritorious lawsuits are undermining the rule of law in our 
prisons and jails, granting the government near-impunity to violate 
the rights of prisoners without fear of consequences. 
This damage to the rule of law in America’s prisons is occurring 
even as those prisons have grown in their importance—both because 
of the nation’s increasing incarcerated population (the world’s larg-
est)3 and the sharpening international focus on American treatment 
of prisoners, both domestically and abroad.4  Amendment is urgently 
needed.  In recent months numerous advocates and organizations 
have urged reform.5  Indeed, a bill offered in the last Congress, the 
 
 2 Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  The PLRA was part of the Omnibus 
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 that ended the 1996 federal 
government budget standoff. 
 3 Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 
(reporting that the United States has the most prisoners of any nation in the world, in-
cluding China); see also International Centre for Prison Studies, King’s College London, 
World Prison Brief, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/world
brief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poptotal (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); ROY 
WALMSLEY, BRIT. HOME OFFICE, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (5th ed. 2003), available 
at  http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r234.pdf. 
 4 See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., America’s Abu Ghraibs, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at A17 (drawing 
a connection between callous attitude towards domestic prisoners fostered by the PLRA 
and abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib); see also Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007:  Hearing 
on H.R. 4109 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of David Fathi, U.S. 
Program Director of Human Rights Watch), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/04/22/usdom18610.htm (explaining how the PLRA 
violates U.S. treaty obligations). 
 5 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTION 102B (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2007/midyear/docs/SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDA
TIONS/hundredtwob.doc; COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, 
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 84–87 (2006), available at http://prisoncommission.org/
report.asp; Letter from the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n to Cong. Bobby Scott 
and Cong. Randy Forbes, Chair and Ranking Minority Members, Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 24, 2008) (on file 
with authors) [hereinafter Letter from the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n].  
Other statements are available at http://www.aclu.org/prison/restrict/32803
res20071115.html and at http://savecoalition.org/latestdev.html.  See also Hearing, supra 
note 4, available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_042208.html. 
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Prison Abuse Remedies Act,6 would offer some moderate fixes to the 
most pressing problems created by the PLRA.  In this Article, we dis-
cuss three of these problems.  First, the PLRA’s ban on awards of 
compensatory damages for “mental or emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury”7 has ob-
structed judicial remediation of religious discrimination, coerced sex, 
and other constitutional violations typically unaccompanied by physi-
cal injury, undermining the regulatory regime that is supposed to 
prevent such abuses.  Second, the PLRA’s provision barring federal 
lawsuits by prisoner plaintiffs who have failed to comply with their 
jails’ or prisons’ internal grievance procedures—no matter how diffi-
cult, futile, or dangerous such compliance might be for them—
obstructs rather than promotes constitutional oversight of conditions 
of confinement.  It strongly encourages prison and jail authorities to 
come up with ever-higher procedural hurdles in order to foreclose 
subsequent litigation.  Third, the application of the PLRA’s limita-
tions to juveniles incarcerated in juvenile institutions has rendered 
those institutions largely immune from judicial oversight because so 
many young people are not able to follow the complex requirements 
imposed by the statute, and compliance by their parents or guardians 
on their behalf has been deemed legally insufficient.  Each of these 
three problems disrupts accountability and enforcement of constitu-
tional compliance. 
Below, we discuss these issues in some depth.  But it is important 
to mention in preface what we see as the primary salutary effect of the 
PLRA—its lightening of the burdens imposed on jail and prison offi-
cials by frivolous litigation.  Pro se prisoner lawsuits in federal court 
are numerous, often lack legal merit, and pose real management 
challenges both for courts and for correctional authorities.  Congress 
passed the PLRA in order to deal with this problem.8  This has in fact 
occurred, in two ways.  First, the PLRA has drastically reduced the 
number of cases filed:  prison and jail inmates filed twenty-six federal 
cases per thousand inmates in 1995; the most current statistic, for 
2006, was less than eleven cases per thousand inmates, a decline of 
 
 6 Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, H.R. 4109, 110th Cong., 1st Session (Nov. 7, 2007). 
 7 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006). 
 8 See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1555–1627 (2003) [here-
inafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation]; see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over 
Time:  A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) (discussing 
the PLRA’s other purpose, to lessen court injunctive supervision of jails and prisons). 
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60%.9  So the PLRA has been extremely effective in keeping down the 
number of federal lawsuits by prisoners, even as incarcerated popula-
tions rise.  Even more important than these sharply declining filing 
rates for understanding the decreasing burden of litigation for prison 
and jail officials are the statute’s screening provisions,10 which require 
courts to dispose of legally insufficient prisoner civil rights cases with-
out even notifying the sued officials of the suit against them and 
without receiving any response from those officials.  Prison or jail of-
ficials no longer need to investigate or answer complaints that are 
frivolous or fail to state a claim under federal law. 
But in addition to frivolous or legally insufficient lawsuits, there 
are, of course, serious cases brought by prisoners:  cases involving life-
threatening deliberate indifference by authorities to prisoner health 
and safety; sexual assaults; religious discrimination; retaliation against 
those who exercise their free speech rights; and so on.  When the 
PLRA was passed, its supporters emphasized over and over:  “[We] do 
not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.  This leg-
islation will not prevent those claims from being raised.  The legisla-
tion will, however, go far in preventing inmates from abusing the 
Federal judicial system.”11  Yet “prevent[ing] inmates from raising le-
gitimate claims” is precisely what the PLRA has done in many in-
stances.  If the PLRA were successfully “reduc[ing] the quantity and 
improv[ing] the quality of prisoner suits,”12 as its supporters intended, 
one would expect the dramatic decline in filings to be accompanied 
by a concomitant increase in plaintiffs’ success rates in the cases that 
remain.  The evidence is quite the contrary.  The shrunken inmate 
 
 9 For 2007 filing statistics, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2007, at 148 tbl.C-2A (2007) (prisoner civil rights, prison 
conditions cases), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/C02
ASep07.pdf; for 1995 filing statistics, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1999, at 139 tbl.C-2A (1999), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/c02asep99.pdf; and for prison population figures, 
see Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1. 
 10 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (2006). 
 11 141 CONG. REC. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The crush-
ing burden of these frivolous suits makes it difficult for the courts to consider meritorious 
claims.”); see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,114 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl) (“If we achieve a 50-percent reduction in bogus Federal prisoner claims, we will free 
up judicial resources for claims with merit by both prisoners and nonprisoners.”); 141 
CONG. REC. S18,136 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 CONG. REC. 
H1480 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady) (“These reasonable require-
ments will not impede meritorious claims by inmates but will greatly discourage claims 
that are without merit.”). 
 12 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 
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docket is less successful than before the PLRA’s enactment; more 
cases are dismissed, and fewer settle.13  An important explanation is 
that constitutionally meritorious cases are now faced with new and of-
ten insurmountable obstacles.  These obstacles are the topic of this 
Article. 
I.  PHYSICAL INJURY 
The PLRA provides that inmate plaintiffs may not recover dam-
ages for “mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody with-
out a prior showing of physical injury.”14  Given the commitment by 
the Act’s supporters that constitutionally meritorious suits would not 
be constrained by its provisions, perhaps the purpose of this provision 
was the limited one of foreclosing tort actions claiming negligent or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress unless they resulted in 
physical injury, which might have otherwise been available to federal 
prisoners under the Federal Tort Claims Act.15  Such an attempt to 
limit what legislators may have considered to be frivolous or inconse-
quential claims16 would echo fairly common state law limitations on 
tort causes of action.17 
Notwithstanding what may have been the limited intent underly-
ing the physical injury requirement, its impact has been much more 
sweeping.  First, many courts have held that the provision covers all 
violations of non-physical constitutional rights.18  Proven violations of 
 
 13 See Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 8, at 1644–64. 
 14 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006). 
 15  28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671–2680 (2006); see also United States v. 
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (allowing a Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit by federal prison-
ers for personal injuries caused by the negligence of government employees). 
 16 See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation:  Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. 
REV. 519, 520 (1996). 
 17 See, e.g., Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law for Negligent Infliction 
of Emotional Distress Under Rule of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 
912 (1968), or Refinements Thereof, 96 A.L.R.5TH 107 § 6 (2002) (citing cases from nine 
states). 
 18 See, e.g., Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that RLUIPA claim is 
“limited” by PLRA physical injury requirement); Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 722–23 
(8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that no compensation is available for retaliation for exercise 
of free speech rights); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2002) (con-
cluding that no compensation is available for violation of due process rights); Searles v. 
Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that no compensation is 
available for violation of religious rights); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 
2000) (concluding that no compensation is available for violation of religious rights); 
Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding that no 
compensation is available for violation of constitutional privacy rights).  But see Canell v. 
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prisoners’ religious rights, speech rights, and due process rights have 
all been held non-compensable, and thus placed largely beyond the 
scope of judicial oversight.  For example, in Searles v. Van Bebber,19 the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that the physical injury requirement barred 
a suit by a Jewish prisoner who alleged a First Amendment violation 
based on his prison’s refusal to give him kosher food.  This result is 
particularly problematic in light of Congress’s notable concern for 
prisoners’ religious freedoms.  The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), passed in 2000, states that “No 
government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exer-
cise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,” unless the 
burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so 
by “the least restrictive means.”20 
Moreover, although the case law is far from uniform, some courts 
have deemed sexual assault not to constitute a “physical injury” within 
the meaning of the PLRA.  In Hancock v. Payne,21 a number of male 
prisoners alleged that over several hours, a corrections officer sexu-
ally assaulted them.  “Plaintiffs claim that they shared contraband 
with [the officer] and that he made sexual suggestions; fondled their 
genitalia; sexually battered them by sodomy, and committed other re-
lated assaults.”22  The plaintiffs further complained that the officer 
“threatened Plaintiffs with lockdown or physical harm should the in-
cident be reported.”23  The district court granted summary judgment 
in part to the defendants.24  One of the grounds for this defense vic-
tory was the physical injury requirement.25  The court said, “the plain-
tiffs do not make any claim of physical injury beyond the bare allega-
tion of sexual assault.”26  In other words, in the view of this district 
court, not even coerced sodomy (which was alleged) constituted 
physical injury.  Though some other courts have decided the ques-
tion differently, the Hancock court is not alone in reaching this con-
clusion.27  As with religious rights, this outcome exists in sharp ten-
 
Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that PLRA “does not preclude 
actions for violations of First Amendment rights”). 
 19 251 F.3d at 872, 876. 
 20 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 21 No. 1:03-CV-671, 2006 WL 21751 (S.D. Miss. Jan 4, 2006). 
 22 Id. at *1. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at *3. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See, e.g., Smith v. Shady, No. 3:05-CV-2663, 2006 WL 314514, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2006) 
(“Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint concerning Officer Shady grabbing his penis and 
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sion with Congress’s recent efforts to eliminate sexual violence and 
coercion behind bars by passing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 
2003.28 
Finally, in case after case, courts have held even serious physical 
symptoms insufficient to allow the award of damages because of the 
PLRA’s physical injury provision.29  In one case, a plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant correctional officer “punch[ed  the] Plaintiff repeat-
edly in his abdominal area, pushed Plaintiff’s head down and repeat-
edly punched Plaintiff with his right hand in the back of his head, hit 
Plaintiff on his left ear, placed Plaintiff’s head between his legs and 
grabbed Plaintiff around his waist and picked the Plaintiff up off the 
ground and dropped Plaintiff on his head.”30  The plaintiff further al-
leged that he “sustained bruises on [his] left ear, back of [his] head 
and swelling to the abdominal area of his body.”31  Nonetheless, the 
district court held the claim insufficient under the PLRA’s physical 
injury provision.32  In another, burns to the plaintiff’s face were 
deemed insufficient because those burns had “healed well,” leaving 
“no lasting effect.”33 
Even when courts reject the defense that unconstitutional conduct 
did not cause a physical injury, the PLRA emboldens prison and jail 
officials to make objectionable arguments that must be litigated, forc-
ing expenditure of resources and prolonging litigation, as well as fur-
ther dehumanizing prisoners and promoting a culture of callous-
 
holding it in her hand do not constitute a physical injury or mental symptoms.”).  But see 
Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that sexual assault constitutes 
physical injury within the meaning of the PLRA).  See generally Deborah M. Golden, It’s 
Not All In My Head:  The Harm of Rape and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 37 (2004) 
 28 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2006). 
 29 See Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. App’x 394, 396–98 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that inmate 
confined for twelve hours in “strip cage” in which he could not sit down did not suffer 
physical injury even though he testified that he had a “bad leg” that swelled “like a grape-
fruit” and that caused severe pain and cramps); Myers v. Valdez, No. 3:05-CV-1799, 2005 
WL 3147869, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2005) (concluding that alleged “pain, numbness 
in extremities, loss of mobility, lack of sleep, extreme tension in neck and back, extreme 
rash and discomfort” did not satisfy PLRA physical injury requirement); Mitchell v. Horn, 
No. 2:98-CV-4742, 2005 WL 1060658, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2005) (reported symptoms 
including “severe stomach aches, severe headaches, severe dehydration . . . and blurred 
vision,” suffered by inmate confined in cell allegedly “smeared with human waste and in-
fested with flies” did not constitute physical injury for PLRA purposes). 
 30 Borroto v. McDonald, No. 5:04-CV-165, 2006 WL 2789152, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 
2006). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at *1. 
 33 Brown v. Simmons, No. 6:03-CV-122, 2007 WL 654920, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2007). 
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ness.34  Moreover, experienced civil rights attorneys hesitate to file 
suits alleging many serious abuses (for example, on behalf of prison-
ers chained to their beds or subjected to sexual harassment by 
guards), because they know that corrections officials will argue—and 
often succeed in arguing—that compensatory damages are barred by 
the PLRA.35 
The point is that the PLRA’s ban on awards of compensatory 
damages for “mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody 
without a prior showing of physical injury” has made it far more diffi-
cult for prisoners to enforce any non-physical rights—including free-
dom of religion and freedom of speech—and to seek compensation 
for any mental rather than physical harm, no matter how intention-
ally, even torturously, inflicted.  (This aspect of the law has, in fact, 
convinced some courts to save the provision from constitutional in-
firmity by reading it not to bar relief.36)  The PLRA has left the avail-
ability of compensatory damages for the constitutional violation of 
coerced sex an open question.  It has posed an obstacle to compensa-
tion even for physical violence, if the physical component of the in-
jury is deemed insufficiently serious.  It has thereby undermined the 
important norms that such infringements of prisoners’ rights are un-
acceptable.  Just as it contradicts constitutional commitments, the 
PLRA is simultaneously obstructing Congress’s recent statutory efforts 
 
 34 See, e.g., Pool v. Sebastian County, 418 F.3d 934, 942–43, 943 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (describ-
ing the argument of the defendant jail officials that the stillbirth of a fetus of four to five 
months gestational age over a jail cell toilet, preceded by days of bleeding, did not satisfy 
PLRA physical injury requirement). 
 35 See Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of Stephen B. Bright, President and Senior 
Counsel, Southern Center for Human Rights), available at 
http://www.judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Bright080422.pdf. 
 36 See Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2006), concluding that the “jury 
was entitled to find that the Plaintiff suffered mental or emotional damages as a result of 
Defendant’s violation of his First Amendment rights [because any] other interpretation 
of § 1997e(e) would be . . . unconstitutional,” id. at 816, and noting:   
 The Court finds the following hypothetical, set forth in Plaintiff’s brief, to be per-
suasive:   
[I]magine a sadistic prison guard who tortures inmates by carrying out fake 
executions—holding an unloaded gun to a prisoner’s head and pulling the 
trigger, or staging a mock execution in a nearby cell, with shots and 
screams, and a body bag being taken out (within earshot and sight of the 
target prisoner).  The emotional harm could be catastrophic but would be 
non-compensable. On the other hand, if a guard intentionally pushed a 
prisoner without cause, and broke his finger, all emotional damages 
proximately caused by the incident would be permitted. 
  Id. (alteration in original).  See also Percival v. Rowley, No. 1:02-CV-363, 2005 WL 2572034, 
at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2005) (“To allow section 1997e(e) to effectively foreclose a 
prisoner’s First Amendment action would put that section on shaky constitutional 
ground.”). 
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to protect prisoners’ religious liberty, as well as freedom from sexual 
abuse. 
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION 
The PLRA’s exhaustion provision states:  “no action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this 
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative reme-
dies as are available are exhausted.”37  The provision appears harmless 
enough.  Who could object, after all, to a regime in which corrections 
officials are given the first opportunity to respond to and perhaps re-
solve prisoners’ claims? 
But in many jails and prisons, administrative remedies are, unfor-
tunately, very difficult to access.  Deadlines may be very short, for ex-
ample, or the number of administrative appeals required may be very 
large.38  The requisite form may be repeatedly unavailable,39 or the 
grievance system may seem not to cover the complaint the prisoner 
seeks to make.40  Prisoners often fear retaliation,41 and, although some 
courts have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement 
based on estoppel or “special circumstances,”42 others have refused to 
excuse prisoners’ lapses.43  Beginning six years after the PLRA’s en-
 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). 
 38 For a survey of prison and jail grievance policy deadlines, see Brief for Jerome N. Frank 
Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent at 6–13 & A1–A7, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (No. 05-416), 2006 WL 
304573 [hereinafter LSO Amicus Brief]. 
 39 See, e.g., Latham v. Pate, No. 1:06-CV-150, 2007 WL 171792, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 
2007) (dismissing suit due to tardy exhaustion in case in which the prisoner who alleged 
that he had been beaten maintained that he was placed in segregation and administrative 
segregation immediately following assault and that “officers did not provide him with the 
grievance forms”). 
 40 See, e.g., Benfield v. Rushton, No. 8:06-CV-2609, 2007 WL 30287, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 
2007) (dismissing suit due to untimely filing of grievance brought by prisoner who al-
leged that he was repeatedly raped by other inmates; prisoner had explained that he 
“didn’t think rape was a grievable issue”); Marshall v. Knight, No. 3:03-CV-460, 2006 WL 
3714713, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 14, 2006) (dismissing, for failure to exhaust, plaintiff’s 
claim that prison officials retaliated against him in classification and disciplinary deci-
sions, even though prison policy dictated that no grievance would be allowed to challenge 
classification and disciplinary decisions). 
 41 See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 118 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 42 See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 43 See, e.g., Garcia v. Glover, 197 F. App’x 866, 867 (11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to excuse non-
exhaustion in case in which inmate alleged that he had been beaten by five guards, de-
spite the fact that prisoner alleged that he feared he would be “killed or shipped out” if 
he filed an administrative grievance); Umstead v. McKee, No. 1:05-CV-263, 2005 WL 
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actment, first some of the Courts of Appeals,44 and finally the Su-
preme Court,45 held that the PLRA forever bars even meritorious 
claims from court if a prisoner has failed to comply with all of the 
many technical requirements of the prison or jail grievance system. 
This means that if prisoners miss deadlines that are often less than 
fifteen days and in some jurisdictions as short as two to five days,46 a 
judge cannot consider valid claims of sexual assault, beatings, or ra-
cial or religious discrimination.  Moreover, the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement has been held to grant constitutional immunity to 
prison officials based on understandable mistakes by pro se prisoners 
operating under rules that are often far from clear.  Wardens and 
sheriffs routinely refuse to engage prisoners’ grievances because 
those prisoners commit minor technical errors, such as using the in-
correct form,47 sending the right documentation to the wrong offi-
cial,48 or failing to file separate forms for each issue, even if the inter-
pretation of a single complaint as raising two separate issues is the 
prison administration’s.49  Each such misstep by a prisoner bars con-
sideration of even an otherwise meritorious civil rights action.50  Al-
though dismissals are often without prejudice, prison grievance dead-
lines are so short that prisoners who failed to exhaust before filing 
suit generally are unable return to court.51 
 
1189605, at *2 (W.D. Mich. May 19, 2005) (“[I]t is highly questionable whether threats of 
retaliation could in any circumstances excuse the failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies.”). 
 44 See Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 45 Woodford, 548 U.S. 81. 
 46 Id. at 118 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]ime requirements . . . are generally no more than 
15 days, and . . . , in nine States, are between 2 and 5 days.”); see also LSO Amicus Brief, 
supra note 38. 
 47 See, e.g., Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 48 See, e.g., Keys v. Craig, 160 F. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 49 Harper v. Laufenberg, No. 3:04-CV-699, 2005 WL 79009, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2005). 
 50 See Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive Power:  
Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 321 (2007) 
(“In a survey of reported cases citing Woodford in the first seven months after it was de-
cided, the majority [of cases in which the exhaustion issue was resolved] were dismissed 
entirely for failure to exhaust.  All claims raised in the complaint survived the exhaustion 
analysis in fewer than fifteen percent of reported cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 51 See, e.g., Rohn v. Beard, No. 2:07-CV-783, 2007 WL 4454417, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (dis-
missing case because prisoner had filed an untimely grievance after his case was initially 
dismissed for incomplete exhaustion); Regan v. Frank, No. 06-CV-66, 2007 WL 106537 at 
*5 (D. Haw. 2007) (“Even though [the court] dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without preju-
dice to the filing of a new action following proper exhaustion, Ngo makes proper exhaus-
tion of these claims impossible.”). 
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For this reason, the National Prison Rape Elimination Commis-
sion, a bipartisan commission appointed under the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act of 2003,52 has warned that the PLRA exhaustion re-
quirement can “frustrate Congress’s goal of eliminating sexual abuse 
in U.S. prisons, jails, and detention centers.”53  The Commission 
wrote to the House Judiciary Committee that “[b]ecause of the emo-
tional trauma and fear of retaliation or repeated abuse that many in-
carcerated rape victims experience, as well as the lack of confidential-
ity in many administrative grievance procedures, many victims find it 
extremely difficult—if not impossible—to meet the short timetables 
of administrative procedures.”54  To solve this problem, the Commis-
sion has proposed (in a working draft of regulatory standards) that 
“Any report of sexual abuse made at any time after the abuse, which 
names a perpetrator and is made in writing to the agency, satisfies the 
exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.”55 
Far from encouraging correctional officials to handle the some-
times frivolous but sometimes extremely serious complaints of in-
mates, the PLRA’s exhaustion rule actually provides an incentive to 
administrators in the state and federal prison systems and the over 
3,000 county and city jail systems to fashion ever higher procedural 
hurdles in their grievance processes.  After all, the more onerous the 
grievance rules, the less likely a prison or jail, or staff members, will 
have to pay damages or be subjected to an injunction in a subsequent 
lawsuit.56  In fact, even when prison and jail administrators want to re-
 
 52 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2006). 
 53 Letter from the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n, supra note 5. 
 54 Id. 
 55 National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, [Draft] Standards for the Prevention, 
Detection, Response, and Monitoring of Sexual Abuse in Adult Prisons and Jails 33 
(2008), http://www.nprec.us/UpcomingEvents/5.1_MasterAdultPrison_andJail_and
ImmigrationStandardsClean.pdf.  At the time this Article went to press, this draft stan-
dard had not yet been submitted to the U.S. Attorney General for approval as a final rule.  
See National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, Standards and Comments, 
http://www.nprec.us/standards.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  
 56 There is evidence that prisons and jails have headed in this direction.  For example, in 
July 2002, in Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court’s dismissal of a case for failure to exhaust; in rejecting the defen-
dants’ argument that the plaintiff’s grievances were insufficiently specific, the court noted 
that the Illinois prison grievance rules were silent as to the requisite level of specificity.  
Less than six months later, the Illinois Department of Corrections proposed new regula-
tions that provided:   
The grievance shall contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s 
complaint including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who 
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. 
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solve a complaint on its merits, the PLRA discourages them from do-
ing so, and therefore actually undermines the very interest in self-
governance Congress intended to serve.57  Can anyone reasonably ex-
pect a governmental agency to resist this kind of incentive to avoid 
merits consideration of grievances?  The officials in question are a 
varied group—elected jailers and sheriffs, appointed jail superinten-
dents, professional wardens, politically appointed commissioners.  
What they all have in common is an understandable interest in avoid-
ing adverse judgments against themselves or their colleagues. 
Thus, by cutting off judicial review based on an inmate’s failure to 
comply with his prison’s own internal, administrative rules—
regardless of the merits of the claim—the PLRA exhaustion require-
ment undermines external accountability.  Still more perversely, it ac-
tually undermines internal accountability, as well, by encouraging 
prisons to come up with high procedural hurdles, and to refuse to 
consider the merits of serious grievances, in order to best preserve a 
defense of non-exhaustion. 
Moreover, courts have generally ignored Justice Breyer’s sugges-
tion in his Woodford v. Ngo concurrence that “well established excep-
tions to exhaustion” from administrative law and habeas corpus doc-
trine58 be implemented in the PLRA context.  Under ordinary 
administrative law, exhaustion is not required where it would be fu-
tile59—for example, if an aggrieved party seeks damages in a case 
where no other kind of relief is applicable, but the administrative 
process is not empowered to award damages.  But the Supreme Court 
has held that the PLRA forecloses a futility exception to its exhaus-
tion requirement.60  Likewise, ordinary administrative law waives ex-
haustion requirements where delay in judicial review imposes a hard-
ship on the plaintiff.61  But most courts have held that the PLRA 
allows no emergency exception from the exhaustion requirement.  As 
one court put it, “The PLRA does not excuse exhaustion for prison-
ers who are under imminent danger of serious physical injury, much 
 
  ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.810(b) (2008); see 26 Ill. Reg. 18065, at § 504.810(b) (Dec. 
27, 2002) (proposing amendment). 
 57 In fact, if an agency chooses to entertain an untimely grievance that merits examination, 
the agency is barred from asserting a failure-to-exhaust defense at later time.  Riccardo v. 
Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 58 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103–04 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 59 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326–27 (1988); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
 60 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (rejecting futility and other exceptions 
for the PLRA). 
 61 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (noting that determination 
of ripeness requires a consideration of the “hardship to the parties”). 
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less for those who are afraid to confront their oppressors.”62  A re-
quirement of administrative exhaustion that punishes failure to cross 
every t and dot every i by conferring constitutional immunity for civil 
rights violations, and allows no exceptions for emergencies, is simply 
unsuited for the circumstances of prisons and jails, where physical 
harm looms so large and prisoners are so ill-equipped to comply with 
legalistic rules. 
Ideally, grievance systems actually improve agency responsiveness 
and performance by helping corrections officials to identify and track 
complaints and to resolve problems.63  Good grievance systems can 
indeed reduce litigation by solving prisoners’ problems.64  But the 
PLRA’s grievance provision instead encourages prison and jail offi-
cials to use their grievance systems in another way—not to solve prob-
lems, but to immunize themselves from future liability.  Judicial over-
sight of prisoners’ civil rights is essential to minimize violations of 
those rights, but the PLRA’s exhaustion provision arbitrarily places 
constitutional violations beyond the purview of the courts. 
It would be relatively simple to achieve the legitimate goal of al-
lowing prison and jail authorities the first chance to solve their own 
problems, yet to avoid the kinds of problems the PLRA has intro-
duced.  The exhaustion provision should not be eliminated, but 
rather amended to require that prisoners’ claims be presented in 
 
 62 Broom v. Rubitschun, No. 1:06-CV-350, 2006 WL 3344997, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 
2006); see also, e.g., Williams v. CDCR, No. 2:06-CV-1373, 2007 WL 2384510, at *4 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 17, 2007) (“The presence of exigent circumstances does not relieve a plaintiff 
from fulfilling this requirement.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 2793117 
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007); Ford v. Smith, No. 1:06-CV-710, 2007 WL 1192298, at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) (dismissing where plaintiff said his safety was in danger and he sought 
a continuance until exhaustion was completed); Rendelman v. Galley, No. 1:06-CV-1999, 
2007 WL 2900460, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 15, 2007) (dismissing despite plaintiff’s claim of 
imminent danger and request for a “protective order” pending exhaustion), aff’d, 230 F. 
App’x 314 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 378 (2007); Aburomi v. United States, 
No. 1:06-CV-3682, 2006 WL 2990362, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2006) (“It is understandable 
that Plaintiff would want immediate treatment for a perceived recurrence of cancer, but 
the administrative remedy program is mandatory regardless of the nature of the relief 
sought.”). 
 63 See LYNN S. BRANHAM ET AL., AM. BAR ASSOC. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, LIMITING THE 
BURDENS OF PRO SE INMATE LITIGATION:  A TECHNICAL-ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR COURTS, 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS, AND ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1997). 
 64 Dora Schriro, Correcting Corrections:  Missouri’s Parallel Universe, in SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS:  ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/181414.pdf; Dora Schriro, Director of the Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, Cor-
recting Corrections:  The Arizona Plan:  Creating Conditions for Positive Change in Cor-
rections, Statement Before the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons 
(Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/
schriro_dora.pdf. 
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some reasonable form to corrections officials prior to adjudication, 
even if that presentment occurs after the prisons’ grievance deadline.  
Cases filed with claims that have not been presented to prison offi-
cials could be stayed for a limited period of time, to allow corrections 
officials an opportunity to address them administratively. 
III.  COVERAGE OF JUVENILES 
The PLRA applies by its plain terms to juveniles and juvenile fa-
cilities.65  But prisoners under age eighteen were not the sources of 
the problems the PLRA was intended to solve.  Even before the 
PLRA, juveniles accounted for very little prisoner litigation.66  This 
dearth of litigation is not surprising.  As the recent investigation into 
alleged sexual abuse in the Texas juvenile system demonstrates, al-
though incarcerated youth are highly vulnerable to exploitation,67 
they generally are not in a position to assert their legal rights.68  Juve-
nile detainees are young, often undereducated, and have very high 
rates of psychiatric disorders.69  Moreover, youth incarcerated in ju-
venile facilities generally do not have access to law libraries or other 
sources of information about the law that might enable them to sue 
more often.  One court has even observed, “[a]s a practical matter, 
 
 65 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(5) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘prison’ means any Federal, State, or local 
facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced 
for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.”). 
 66 Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy:  The Role of Litigation in Correcting Conditions in 
Juvenile Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 681 (1998) (reporting that as of 1998, 
“[t]here [were] less than a dozen reported opinions directly involving challenges to con-
ditions in juvenile detention centers”). 
 67 Ralph Blumenthal, Investigations Multiplying in Juvenile Abuse Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2007, at A24; Ralph Blumenthal, One Account of Abuse and Fear in Texas Youth Detention, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at A19; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, CUSTODY AND CONTROL:  CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK’S JUVENILE 
PRISONS FOR GIRLS (2006), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/us0906/us0906
webwcover.pdf (detailing abuse in the New York girls’ juvenile prisons). 
 68 See Staci Semrad, Texas Ranger Tells of Prosecutor’s “Lack of Interest”, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 
2007, at A20, describing a sergeant in the Texas Rangers who investigated abuses at the 
West Texas State School in Pyote, and told a legislative committee that he “saw kids with 
fear in their eyes—kids who knew they were trapped in an institution that would never re-
spond to their cries for help.”  The sergeant said he was unable to convince a local prose-
cutor to take action. 
 69 LOURDES M. ROSADO & RIYA S. SHAH, PROTECTING YOUTH FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION 
WHEN UNDERGOING SCREENING, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT WITHIN THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2007), available at http://jlc.org/files/publications/
protectingyouth.pdf (“[S]ome large scale studies suggest that as many as 65%-75% of the 
youth involved in the juvenile justice system have one or more diagnosable psychiatric 
disorders.”). 
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juveniles between the ages of twelve and nineteen, who, on average, 
are three years behind their expected grade level, would not benefit 
in any significant respect from a law library, and the provision of such 
would be a foolish expenditure of funds.”70 
As with unincarcerated children, when juveniles do bring lawsuits, 
or otherwise seek to remedy any problems they face behind bars, it is 
very often their parents or other caretaking adults who take the lead.  
It is, after all, parents’ ordinary role to try to protect their children.  
But the PLRA’s exhaustion provision stymies such parental efforts, in-
stead holding incarcerated youth to an impossibly high standard of 
self-reliance.  The case of Minix v. Pazera71 is a leading example of the 
result.  In Minix, a young man, S.Z., and his mother, Cathy Minix, 
filed a civil rights suit for abuse that S.Z. endured while incarcerated 
as a minor in 2002 and 2003 in Indiana juvenile facilities.  While in 
custody, S.Z. was repeatedly beaten, once with “padlock-laden 
socks.”72  After one beating, he suffered a seizure, but no one helped 
him, and he was beaten again the next day.73  He was raped and wit-
nessed another child being sexually assaulted.74  S.Z. was afraid to re-
port the assaults to staff—and his fear was natural enough in light of 
the fact that some of the staff were involved in arranging fights be-
tween juveniles, or would even “handcuff one juvenile so other juve-
nile detainees could beat him.”75 
Although S.Z. feared retaliation, Mrs. Minix made what the dis-
trict court termed “heroic efforts to protect her son.”76  She spoke 
with staff and wrote to the juvenile judges.77  She attempted to meet 
with the superintendent of one of the facilities, though she was pre-
vented from doing so by staff.78  She contacted the Deputy Depart-
ment of Corrections Commissioner and the Governor.79  Ultimately, 
because of her efforts, S.Z. was “unexpectedly released on order from 
the Governor’s office.”80 
 
 70 Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995); see also Anna Rapa, Comment, 
One Brick Too Many:  The Prison Litigation Reform Act as a Barrier to Legitimate Juvenile Law-
suits, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263, 279 (2006). 
 71 No. 1:04-CV-447, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005). 
 72 Id. at *2. 
 73 Id. at *1. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at *2. 
 76 Id. at *7. 
 77 Id. at *2. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at *4. 
 80 Id. at *2. 
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Nonetheless, the district court dismissed the Minix family’s federal 
claims under the PLRA’s exhaustion rule because S.Z. had not him-
self filed a grievance in the juvenile facility.81  At the time, the Indiana 
juvenile grievance policy allowed incarcerated youths only two busi-
ness days to file a grievance.82 
Only two months after S.Z.’s suit was dismissed, the Civil Rights 
Division of the U. S. Department of Justice concluded an investiga-
tion and confirmed that one of the Indiana facilities where S.Z. had 
been assaulted, the South Bend Juvenile Facility, “fail[ed] to ade-
quately protect the juveniles in its care from harm,” and violated the 
constitutional rights of juveniles in its custody.83  The federal govern-
ment further concluded that the grievance system that S.Z. was 
faulted for not using was “dysfunctional” and “contribute[d] to the 
State’s failure to ensure a reasonably safe environment.”84 
Incarcerated children and youths do not clog the courts with law-
suits, frivolous or otherwise.  Though they are often incapable of 
complying with the tight deadlines and complex requirements of in-
ternal correctional grievance systems, their lack of capacity should 
not immunize abusive staff from the accountability that comes with 
court oversight.  Those under eighteen do not file many lawsuits, and 
are not the source of any problem the PLRA is trying to solve.  And 
they are particularly poorly positioned to deal with its limits.  They 
should be exempted from its reach. 
*  *  * 
When federal courthouses are barred to constitutionally meritori-
ous cases, the resulting harm is not merely to the affected prisoners 
but to our entire system of accountability that ensures that govern-
ment officials comply with constitutional mandates.  The erection of 
hurdles to accountability should not be seen as “reducing the bur-
den” for correctional administrators—it should be recognized as 
weakening the rule of law.  The PLRA must be amended. 
 
 81 Id. at *7. 
 82 Id. at *3.  Epilogue:  The Minix family re-filed in state court, where the suit avoided ex-
haustion analysis because S.Z. was no longer incarcerated; the defendants once again re-
moved the case to federal court, and this time the suit was permitted to go forward.  
Minix v. Pazera, No. 3:06-CV-398, 2007 WL 4233455 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 28, 2007). 
 83 Letter from Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Mitch Daniels, Governor of the State of Ind. 3 (Sept. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/split_indiana_southbend_juv_findlet_9-9-
05.pdf. 
 84 Id. at 7. 
